Lindsay Crawford

Lindsay Crawford specializes in epistemology and ethics. Much of her work focuses on the moral dimensions of inquiry and belief formation. Some of the questions at the heart of her research concern whether, and to what extent, the ways we go about forming beliefs ought to be sensitive to moral considerations and our social commitments of various kinds.

She has published on questions about whether the value of friendship affects what we ought to believe about our friends. (Should we believe better of our friends because they’re our friends? Even if the evidence suggests otherwise?) She has also published on the nature of epistemic injustice, with a focus on how to make sense of the distinctive moral wrong of failing to believe someone on the basis of an identity prejudice one holds against them. More recently, her work has focused on broader questions in this general domain, about whether, and in what sense, our beliefs themselves can wrong others. (Can your beliefs about another person wrong them, even if you manage not to act on those beliefs or otherwise make those beliefs known?)

Some representative publications here include:

• “Believing the Best,” Synthese 196, no. 4 (2019).
• “Relationships and Reasons for Belief,” in The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity (Routledge Studies in Epistemology).
• “Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition,” Ergo 7, no. 31 (2021).

She has recently begun work on the nature of testimony concerning major life decisions that have been personally transformative, with a particular focus on how to understand the normative significance of testimony that involves certain forms of retrospective evaluation. (Can testimony that involves retrospectively assessing one’s own choice—often through the lens of affirmation or regret—guide others in their own deliberation about whether and how to make similar choices?)

Prof. Crawford teaches a wide range of courses in the philosophy department. In recent years, she has focused primarily on adding new courses to the department’s offerings in theoretical and applied ethics, including Ethical Theory (PHI 222) and Reproductive Ethics (PHI 230). She regularly teaches Bioethics (PHI 229), which introduces students to ethical issues related to medicine, healthcare, and biotechnology. In addition to teaching introductory survey courses and courses in her areas of expertise, she also has side interests in early modern philosophy, and semi-regularly offers a seminar on the major philosophical works of David Hume.